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a b s t r a c t
People are more sensitive to losses than to equivalent gains when making financial de-
cisions. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to illuminate how the
amygdala contributes to loss aversion. The blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response
of the amygdala was mapped while healthy individuals were responding to 50/50 gambles
with varying potential gain and loss amounts. Overall, subjects demanded twice as high
potential gain as loss to accept a gamble. The individual level of loss aversion was
expressed by the decision boundary, i.e., the gain-loss ratio at which subjects accepted and
rejected gambles with equal probability. Amygdala activity increased the more the gain-
loss ratio deviated from the individual decision boundary showing that the amygdala
codes action value. This response pattern was more strongly expressed in loss aversive
individuals, linking amygdala activity with individual differences in loss aversion.
Together, the results show that the amygdala signals subjective appetitiveness or aver-
siveness of gain-loss ratios at the time of choice.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
When making economic decisions, people often deviate from
rational behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For instance,
people tend to overestimate the impact of losing, consequently
biasing decisions towards loss aversion: when presented with
risky gambles with equal chances of winning and losing,
people demandonaverage twice the amount of potential gains
compared to losses in order to accept a gamble (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007).
Clinical investigations have found diminished loss
aversion-bias in amygdala-lesioned patients compared to
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healthy controls (De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010). How
the amygdala influence the willingness to accept gambles is
not clear. One possibility is that the amygdala are responding
tomagnitudes of either gains or losses in order to avoid or deal
with aversive events (LeDoux, 2000). In line with this view, a
recent loss aversion study reported that amygdala activity
reflected magnitudes of single losses, but not single gains
(Canessa et al., 2013). However, other neuroimaging studies
failed to support an involvement of amygdala in the evalua-
tion of single losses or gains (Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, &
Phelps, 2013; Tom et al., 2007). These studies rather pointed
to other dopaminergic meso-cortico-limbic target areas such
as the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and ventral stria-
tum which process single gain and loss magnitudes.
The classical view that the amygdala are mainly geared to
negative eventshas been recently challengedbyneuroimaging
studies showing that the amygdala computes both negative
and positive stimulus values during value-based decision-
making (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Bermudez, Gobel, & Schultz,
2012; Grabenhorst, Hernadi, & Schultz, 2012; Jenison, Rangel,
Oya, Kawasaki, & Howard, 2011). The “bivalent” coding of
value in the amygdala, which is not specific to negativity or
positivity of a stimulus, per se, suggests that theamygdalamay
track other properties of these value stimuli such as task
relevance, the impact or consequence of a choice, or the bio-
logical salience of a stimulus. Indeed, several lines of work
indicate that the involvement of the amygdala in decision-
making goes beyond mere value estimation. Functional neu-
roimaging revealed context dependent activation of the
amygdala reflecting whether choices were framed in terms of
avoiding losses or seeking gains (De Martino, Kumaran,
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Further, amygdala activity was
linked to choice-related emotions such as ‘relief of a good
choice’ or ‘regret of a bad choice’ (Coricelli et al., 2005; Rogan,
Leon, Perez, & Kandel, 2005; Sangha, Chadick, & Janak, 2013;
Seymour et al., 2005). Finally, a series of studies suggest that
the amygdala play a key role in evaluating task relevance
rather than reflecting the absolute magnitude of value (Bzdok
et al., 2011; Ousdal, Reckless, Server, Andreassen, & Jensen,
2012; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003; Wright & Liu, 2006).
Here, we aimed at resolving the role of amygdala in loss
aversive decision-making. We used fMRI to map BOLD-
responses in the amygdala of healthy subjects, who decided
whether to accept or reject “mixed” (gain-loss) gambles. We
manipulated only magnitudes of potential gains and losses,
while keeping win-lose probabilities equal (i.e., 50%). Partici-
pants received no feedback on whether they won or lost,
creating a decision-context of maximal uncertainty. Inter-
individual differences in the tendency to weigh losses higher
than gains were expressed by the individual decision bound-
ary lambda (l), which represents the gain-loss ratio where
subjects on average choose to accept or reject bets with equal
probability.
Importantly, in contrast to previous loss aversion studies
(Canessaetal., 2013;DeMartinoetal., 2010; Sokol-Hessner etal.,
2013; Tom et al., 2007), each gamble started with a magnitude
presentation phase where either the potential loss or gain
amount of the gamble was presented alone. This was followed
by a decision phase where the full gamble with specified loss
and gain amount appeared, and subjectswere required to reject
or accept themixed gamble (Fig. 1A). This procedure allowed us
to temporally separate neural responses elicited by increasing
gainor loss amounts during thefirst part of the gamble fromthe
assessment of the full mixed gamble defined by the gain-loss
ratio during the decision-making phase.
Our study tested two mutually exclusive hypotheses: The
amygdala might primarily respond to individual magnitudes
of potential monetary losses and/or gains (Belova, Paton,
Morrison, & Salzman, 2007; Belova, Paton, & Salzman, 2008;
Canessa et al., 2013; Paton, Belova, Morrison, & Salzman,
2006; Salzman, Paton, Belova, & Morrison, 2007). Alterna-
tively, the amygdala might integrate both gain and loss-
magnitudes into the decision process. The latter hypothesis
makes the prediction that the amygdala assesses the value of
the full gain-loss ratio, relative to the individual decision
boundary l. If this were the case, amygdala activity might
either be tuned to gain-loss ratios far away from the individual
decision boundary or preferentially deal with increasingly
ambiguous decisions, i.e., gamble ratios that are close to the
individual decision boundary.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Subjects
Sixteen male subjects (age range 20e32 years; median age 24
years; 9 right handed) participated in the experiment. Two
additional subjects were scanned but not analysed, one due to
experimenter error, and one due to missing field
measurements.
Subjects were screened for any history of neurological or
cardiovascular disorders, contra-indications to MRI-scanning
and signed health declarations before study commence-
ment. The study was approved under the ethical protocol KF
01 e 131/03, issued by the local ethics committee. Subjects
were added to one of four condition-groups in order to even
out unwanted visual or motor artefacts: They either received
the gain amount written in orange numerals on the purple
half of the pie chart and the loss amount on the orange side
with purple numerals, or vice versa.Within this division there
were two sub-conditions: a group that answered “yes” with
the right index finger, and a group that answered “yes” with
right middle finger.
2.2. Instruction
Subjects were instructed and trained on the task outside the
scanner until they were familiar with it. They were told that
after completing the task in the scanner, the computer would
randomly draw out three bets, and that all three bets would be
played with fiftyefifty chance of winning or losing. They were
also reminded that gambling amounts represented real po-
tential losses or gains which after the experiment would be
either added to or deducted from their initial participation fee
of 350 Danish kroner which corresponds to an endowment of
z58.5 US Dollars (NB, 1 Danish kroner z .167 US Dollar.
Hereafter $ are used in the text), with a max loss or gain of
$25.1. In reality, this was a framing setup and all subjects
ended up earning between $20.1e23.4 in addition to the $58.5.
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2.3. Stimuli and setting
Stimuli were projected onto a screen behind the scanner, and
consisted of purple and orange pie charts on a uniform gray
colour background. Amounts were presented in Danish cur-
rency with purple or orange digits. The 64 gain/loss stimuli
combined the 8 potential gain amounts ($11.3e27.8; in in-
crements of $2.3), with the 8 potential loss amounts
($5.7e13.9; in increments of $1.7). Each of the stimuli belonged
to one of 8 classes, identified by the angle of the pie chart
which was rotated with 45 (0e360) for each class. Thus,
although each amount (e.g., þ$16) appeared 16 times, it was
Fig. 1 e Task design and behavioral results. A) Event-related fMRI paradigm; Subjects received potential loss and gain
amounts of a given gamble sequentially, with half of the trials starting with potential loss and the other half with
potential gain amount. When both potential gain and loss amounts were presented, subjects chose whether to accept or
reject the gamble. Inter-trial intervals (ITIs) separated two trials. Stimuli consisted of 64 different gain-loss ratios. All
ratios were presented twice in randomized order. Color-coded heat-maps representing: B) choice patterns for group (left)
and individuals (right), and C) response time patterns for group and individuals. Color-intensities indicate increasing %
probability of accepting gambles, and increasing response time, respectively. Dotted lines indicate group average decision
boundary, l, of 2.16. This was the point at which subjects chose to accept and reject gain-loss ratios with equal
probability.
c o r t e x 6 6 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 8 1e9 0 83
only presented once in the same physical position on the
screen per main condition (gain or loss first), as to avoid any
visual repetition-effects.
The 64 mixed gambles were presented once in a ‘gain first’
and once in a ‘loss first’ condition, yielding a total of 128 trials.
To ensure that subjects were attentive to the task and to in-
crease the amount of ratios below 1, we added 18 highly
disadvantageous ‘catch’ trials. These trials combined 3 low
gain amounts (i.e., $5.7, 6.9, 8) with 3 high loss amounts (i.e.,
$23.1, 25.4, 27.8). All subjects rejected at least 89% of the catch
trials, indicating that subjects payed attention to the task.
Finally, we added 24 ‘base-line’ trials: “empty” purple/orange
pie charts with no letters or numbers with the exception of a
central fixation cross. When these randomly distributed trials
appeared, subjects had been instructed to wait passively until
the next trial. Stimuli were presented and button presses
recorded using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
2.4. Study procedure
On each trial, subjects were presented with a pie chart with
either a potential gain amount or a potential loss amount,
according to main condition. After a varying display time
(2e5 sec), the second amount of the mixed gamble was
presented (see Fig. 1A) and subjects used right index and
middle fingers to either accept or reject the bet by pressing a
button.
Subjects were instructed to answer as fast as possible, and
that there was no correct or incorrect strategy for choosing:
They should simply follow their ‘gut-feeling’ when choosing.
The 170 trials were randomly distributed over two runs each
lasting 11 m 36 sec, with an average trial length of 8.2 sec.
Between each run we performed a short B0 mapping scan,
allowing the participants a few minutes of rest.
2.5. Imaging methods
Functional and structural MR scans were collected using a
Siemens Magnetom Trio 3T MR scanner with an 8-channel
head coil (Invivo, FL, USA) at Copenhagen University Hospital
Hvidovre, Copenhagen, Denmark. Subjects' heads were sta-
bilized by foam padding to reduce motion artefacts. We
collected 295 functional volumes using a whole brain T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (41 slices;
repetition time (TR): 2430 msec; echo time (TE): 30 msec; flip
angle: 90; field of view (FOV): 192 mm, horizontal plane). The
first two volumeswere discarded as dummy scans to allow the
field to reach steady state. High-resolution 3D full brain
magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo
(MPRAGE) structural scans were acquired for the purpose of
spatial normalization and co-registration as well as for
creating a visualisation template to be used in the figures
(1 mm isotropic voxels; FOV: 256 mm; acquisition matrix
256  256; TR: 1540; TE: 3.93 msec, inversion time: 800 msec,
flip-angle: 9). We included B0 field measurement after each
EPI recording (TR: 488 msec; TE: 6.16 msec), with 33 slices
oriented as defined in the EPI scan (3  3  3 mm slices, no
interslice gap, 20 oblique to transverse plane).
2.6. Behavioral analysis
We calculated the subject specific lambda (l) measure, by
fitting a logistic regression model to each participant's binary
response (accept/reject) with gain-loss ratio as the indepen-
dent variable. In this model l indicated the gain-loss ratio for
which the probability of accepting a trial was equal to the
probability of not accepting a trial.
2.7. Imaging analysis
All analysis was carried out using SPM8 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Cognitive Neurology, UCL, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm). The pre-processing of imaging data included
spatial realignment to the mean image, normalization to an
MNI template image, smoothing using an isotropic 8 mm
FWHMGaussian kernel, and high-pass temporal filtering (cut-
off frequency 1/128 Hz). A Volterra expansion of the estimated
head motion parameters, as well as aliased Fourier expan-
sions of the cardiac- and respiration cycles were included as
regressors of no interest in the first level general linear model
(GLM) (Lund, Madsen, Sidaros, Luo, & Nichols, 2006). In addi-
tion, we included regressors for catch trials, error trials (i.e.,
250 msec > RT > 2500 msec and trials with no answer) and
regressors modeling out the motor activation related to finger
button presses.
For all regions outside the amygdala, BOLD signal changes
were considered statistically significantwhen they exceeded a
family-wise error (FWE) whole brain corrected cluster
threshold of p  .05, using an entry threshold of p  .001.
Trends were reported only if below a threshold of p  .001,
without correction for multiple comparisons. Due to our a
priori hypothesis regarding the involvement of the amygdala
in loss aversion, we performed small volume corrections (SVC)
on BOLD data using an anatomical ROI mask of the bilateral
amygdala from Wfu PickAtlas (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, &
Burdette, 2003). For brain regions where we used SVC (i.e.,
the amygdala), we applied the FWE method at the voxel level
to correct for multiple comparisons. Other areas of interest
believed to play a role in loss aversion and decision-making
are reported at trend level: 1. Striatum, 2. mOFC/vmPFC, 3.
Midbrain, 4. Anterior insula, 5. Anterior Cingulate Cortex
(ACC; Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013).
2.7.1. General linear models
Our main GLM included two time-points of interest: the
magnitude presentation phase and the decision phase
(Fig. 1A). The magnitude presentation phase was divided into
separate “gain events” and “loss events”, each modeled with
their individual amounts as parametric linear modulations.
The decision phase was divided into two main regressors of
interest: “appetitive bets” and “aversive bets” relative to the
subject specific decision boundary l (i.e., according to whether
the trial gain-loss ratio was either larger or smaller than in-
dividual l, respectively). BOLD signal of each of these two
main regressors were then modeled in a linear parametric
manner with the absolute difference between the current trial
gain/loss ratio and the subject specific decision boundary l
(i.e., the euclidian “distance” to l). The main contrast of
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interestwas the absolute distance to l and thus, included joint
activity from both of these linear parametric predictors.
We furthermore analysed the decision phase of the main
model to reveal activity patterns corresponding to a simple
monotonic increase in neural activity with the magnitude of
gain-loss ratios (i.e., from very worst to best gain-loss ratio).
In the following section, we describe additional GLMs
which were designed to further explore the role of amygdala
in loss aversive decision-making. Importantly, the models
were post-hoc created to ascertain that the neural signature in
amygdala as revealed by the main GLM was not better
explained by other properties of the gambles. The new GLMs
only differed from the main model in the way they modeled
the main predictors of interest in the decision-phase. Pre-
sentation phase, catch trials, error regressors etc. were iden-
tical throughout the models.
First, to investigate the effect of the order in which gains
and losses were presented we constructed a model, where the
decision phase was divided according to whether a gain or a
loss had been presented first. Second, we constructed amodel
which included a parametric modulation of the decision
phase with ‘highest stakes’ (i.e., which ever was highest of
either the potential gain or two times the potential loss), and a
third model which included a modulation with ‘joint stakes’
(i.e., potential gain þ absolute potential loss). Finally, the de-
cision phase of our study was inspired by a previous loss
aversion paradigm by Tom et al. (2007), which differentiated
activity changes scaled to increasing gain or loss magnitudes
during decision-making. In order to emulate the model used
by Tom et al. (2007), we included a GLM with three parametric
modulations of BOLD activation during the decision phase
which separated activation corresponding to: 1) increasing
potential gain amount, 2) increasing potential loss amount,
and 3) distance of the gain-loss ratio of a given trial to a fixed
gain-loss ratio (i.e., a l of 2).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
All subjects weighted potential losses higher than potential
gains with a l-value above 1 (mean l¼ 2.16; median l ¼ 2.08;
range of individual l-values: 1.38e2.92). This is consistent
with previous studies, which reportedmean l-values around 2
(Tom et al., 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Decision time
increased with ambiguity of the bet. The more the gain-loss
ratio of a gamble approached the individual decision bound-
ary l, the more time subjects needed to decide whether or not
to accept the gamble (p < .001, R2 ¼ .12; see also Fig. 1C).
3.2. Imaging results
3.2.1. The role of the amygdala in weighting mixed gambles
Given our region-specific a priori hypothesis, we primarily
examined task-related activity as reflected by the BOLD
response in the amygdala. We first addressed the hypothesis
that amygdala integrates gains and losses to estimate the full
gamble ratio during decision-making. We evidenced changes
in neural activity reflecting the distance between a given trial
gain-loss ratio and the individual decision boundary l (Left:
x ¼ 24, y ¼ 6, z ¼ 18, PSVC < .001, Z ¼ 4.96; Right: x ¼ 32,
y ¼ 4, z ¼ 26, PSVC ¼ .017, Z ¼ 3.73; see Fig. 2 and Table 1).
An additional exploratory whole-brain analysis identified
several significant clusters where decision-related activity
increased in proportion to the distance between the gain-loss
ratio of the mixed gamble and the subjective decision bound-
ary l. These clusters were located in bilateral mid- and supe-
rior temporal gyri, mid- and posterior parts of insula, and pre-,
para- and post-central gyri (Table 1). Conversely, clusters in
themidbrain (x¼ 8, y¼12, z¼4, puncorr < .001, Z¼ 4.09), left
ventral caudate nucleus (x ¼ 10, y ¼ 14, z ¼ 4, puncorr < .001,
Z ¼ 3.50), right anterior insula (x ¼ 28, y ¼ 20, z ¼ 4, pun-
corr < .001, Z ¼ 3.54) as well as in right ACC (x ¼ 6, y ¼ 24, z ¼ 42, puncorr < .001,
Z¼ 3.50) showed opposite trends towards a gradual increase in
neural activity the more the gain-loss ratio approached the
individual decision boundary.
We also tested whether the response profile of the amyg-
dala was driven by either increasingly aversive or appetitive
gambles alone. Here, we found that increasingly aversive bets
with an unfavorable gamble ratio (relative to the individual l-
value) yielded a linear increase in BOLD signal in the right
amygdala (x ¼ 30, y ¼ 4, z ¼ 26, pSVC ¼ .004, Z ¼ 4.14), and a
trend in the left amygdala (x ¼ 26, y ¼ 2, z ¼ 16,
puncorr ¼ .001, Z ¼ 3.15). A similar effect was found for
increasingly appetitive bets, where the left amygdala dis-
played a linear increase in activity with increasing distance to
the individual l-value (x ¼ 26, y ¼ 6, z ¼ 18, pSVC ¼ .027,
Z ¼ 3.50), and a similar trend in the right hemisphere (x ¼ 32,
y¼2, z¼12, puncorr¼ .001, Z¼ 3.01). Together, these results
show that both increasingly appetitive and aversive bets
contribute to the amygdala activation. Although the effect
was more pronounced in the left hemisphere for increasingly
appetitive gambles and in the right hemisphere for increas-
ingly aversive gambles, the interaction between the two did
not yield any changes in activity in the amygdala, even when
using a liberal threshold of puncorr< .01.
The graded increase of amygdala activity with distance
from the individual decision boundary lwas not influenced by
the order inwhich the gain and loss amountwere presented in
the preceding magnitude presentation phase, neither
regarding changes in BOLD levels nor behaviorally (F < .001;
p > .99).
When confronted with the mixed gambles, amygdala ac-
tivity was tuned to the distance of the gain-loss ratio from the
individual decision boundary l. This pattern is compatible
with the notion that the amygdala integrates the gain and loss
amounts conjointly. However, this response pattern could still
be explained by other properties of the bets, such as tracking
the “highest stake”, i.e., themost salient of the two amounts in
the mixed gamble. For instance, if a trial offered a potential
monetary loss of $8 and a potential gain of $23.1, then the
amount with highest “impact” would be $23.1 (note: in this
model, losses were multiplied by 2 to reflect the larger sub-
jective negative value of losses). Another possibility could be
that the engagement of the amygdala was tracking “joint
stakes” (e.g., if a trial offered a potential loss of $8 and a po-
tential gain of $23.1, then joint stakes would be:
loss þ gain ¼ 8 þ 23.1 ¼ $31.1). To investigate these possibil-
ities we performed two complementary analyses in which we
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includedmodeling of the “highest stakes” or the “joint stakes”
to our original statistical model. The activity profile in the
amygdala was neither reflected by the “highest stake” nor the
“joint stakes” of a gamble, even using a liberal threshold of
puncorr< .01.
3.2.2. Effect of loss aversion
Wewere interested in testingwhether the individual degree of
loss aversion was reflected in the neural activity of the
amygdala using the individual l value of participants as a
covariate in the second level analysis. Individuals who were
more loss averse (i.e., who had a higher l and rejected more
Fig. 2 e Activity profile of the amygdala during the decision-making phase. A) Brain responses reflecting distance to the
individual decision boundary l. White circle indicates left amygdala cluster (x¼¡24, y¼¡6, z¼¡18, pSVC < .001, Z¼ 4.96).
Figure B and C further illustrates the sensitivity of the amygdala to the decision boundary l. They are based on a post hoc
analysis created for illustrative purposes, which included 16 regressors (“bins”) each containing 4 adjacent gain-loss ratios.
B) The heat-map illustrates the activation pattern in left amygdala peak (using an 8-voxel sphere), showing that amygdala
responses are higher for increasing deviations from the decision boundary. The colors of this heatmap represent strength of
activation within each of the 16 bins. C) Response profile of the left amygdala to extreme ratios relative to the intermediate
ones around the decision boundary. The x-axis denotes gain to loss ratios in each of the 16 bins of the post hoc analysis. Y-
values indicate %-signal change of global mean.
Table 1 e Group results: Clusters showing increases in neural activity (as reflected by the BOLD response) with increasing
distance to decision boundary.
Cluster size Anatomical peak region Hemisphere x y z Z value
3317 Rolandic operculum/insula L 44 14 20 5.22
Inferior parietal lobule L 62 46 22 4.74
Middle temporal gyrus L 50 12 20 4.64
285 Amygdala L 24 6 18 4.96
Hippocampus L 28 6 26 4.06
675 Paracentral lobule R 4 30 70 4.95
Paracentral lobule L 6 38 72 4.44
210 Insula/putamen R 34 6 8 4.91
1850 Middle temporal gyrus R 46 10 20 4.81
Middle temporal gyrus R 50 4 16 4.51
Superior temporal gyrus R 50 6 14 4.35
324 Angular gyrus R 62 60 22 4.22
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gambles) showed a steeper rise in regional activity with
increasing distance between the individual decision boundary
l and the gain-loss ratio of the gamble. Regions showing this
effect were the left ventral striatum (x ¼ 14, y ¼ 8, z ¼ 10,
pcluster ¼ .037, Z ¼ 4.44, Fig. 3A) and the left amygdala (x ¼ 22,
y ¼ 0, z ¼ 14, pSVC ¼ .005, Z ¼ 4.08, Fig. 3B).
We then assessed whether this loss aversion effect was
present for both increasingly appetitive and aversive bets.
Increasingly appetitive bets were associated with a significant
correlation between loss aversion and left amygdala activity
(x¼18, y¼2, z¼18, pSVC¼ .039, Z¼ 3.37). For increasingly
aversive bets, we found trend activation in the right amygdala,
(x ¼ 18, y ¼ 4, z ¼ 18, puncorr ¼ .001, Z ¼ 3.01). The difference
between the appetitive and aversive bets and their correlation
with loss aversion did not yield any significant effects in the
amygdala, even at a liberal threshold of puncorr< .01.
3.2.3. Neural responses to the magnitude of potential gains
and losses in the decision phase
So far, we have focused on the neural response to the full gain/
loss ratios during the decision-phase. However, we wanted to
investigate whether these brain responses could be better
explained by the separate magnitude of gains or losses during
the decision phase. We emulated the analysis used in Tom
et al. (2007), which probed for activity changes in brain re-
gions correlating with either 1) increasing gain magnitude, 2)
increasing loss magnitude and 3) trial ratio distance to a fixed
lambda of 2, during the decision-phase. In accordance with
their study, we found a weak trend activation in ventral
striatum for increasing potential gain (Supplementary Fig. 1).
However, we failed to reproduce the reported deactivation in
ventral striatum with increasing potential loss or the mOFC
activation and deactivation for gains and losses. Neither
magnitude of gains, losses nor increasing distance to a fixed
lambda of 2, yielded any amygdala activation during the
decision-phase. However, when using the increasing distance
to a fixed lambda of 2 as the only parametric modulation of the
BOLD response, the left amygdala showed significant activity
modulation (x ¼ 28, y ¼ 2, z ¼ 22, pSVC ¼ .033, Z ¼ 3.41).
3.2.4. Magnitude of gain-loss ratio
We performed an additional analysis to identify brain regions
where neural activity during the decision phase increased
monotonically with the gain-loss ratio of the mixed gambles
(from worst to best). A cluster in the dorsal midbrain covering
superior colliculus and dorsal raphe region (x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28,
z ¼ 8, pcluster < .001, Z ¼ 4.29) showed gradual increases in
activity with increasingly appetitive ratios, as did the caudal
portion of the ventral striatum (x ¼ 2, y ¼ 0, z ¼ 4,
pcluster ¼ .002, Z ¼ 4.09; Fig. 4). We found no reductions in
regional BOLD signal with increasing gain-loss ratios, even at
a liberal threshold of Puncorr< .01. The individual degree of loss
aversion as indexed by l did not influence the activity increase
in the midbrain or striatum with increasing appetitiveness of
gain-loss ratios. Instead, regional increases in activity with
Fig. 3 e Neural correlates of loss aversion during decision-
making. A) Increased left ventral striatum activation was
found for more loss averse individuals to increasingly
extreme ratios (pcluster ¼ .037, Z ¼ 4.44). B) Stronger
responses to higher loss aversion was also found in left
amygdala (pSVC ¼ .007, Z ¼ 4.08).
Fig. 4 e Activity profile in ventral striatum during decision-
making. A) Linear increase in neural activity with the
magnitude of gain-loss ratios in a caudal region of the
ventral striatum, (pcluster ¼ .002, Z ¼ 4.09) and a midbrain
cluster (pcluster < .001, Z ¼ 4.29) covering the superior
colliculi and dorsal raphe nucleus. B) Plot of the positive
linear relationship between BOLD signal in the ventral
striatum (8-voxel sphere) and gamble ratio, based on the
post hoc “16-ratio bins” analysis.
c o r t e x 6 6 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 8 1e9 0 87
increasing loss aversion were found in the right superior oc-
cipital/inferior parietal lobe (x ¼ 30, y ¼ 70, z ¼ 26, pclus-
ter < .001, Z ¼ 4.22) and mid-occipital lobe (x ¼ 22, y ¼ 90, z ¼ 2,
pcluster ¼ .008, Z ¼ 3.79).
3.2.5. Neural responses to the magnitude of potential gains
and losses in the presentation phase
Passive viewing of potential gains and losses in the presen-
tation phase was investigated by combining the effect of
decreasing potential loss and increasing potential gain. This
effect of value was reflected in the left anterior insula, as well
as a trend in the right anterior insula (Supplementary Fig. 2).
Valuation of potential gains and losses also activated the left
supra-marginal gyrus and precentral gyrus, right lingual gyrus
and precuneus. The left ventral striatum also showed a trend
activation (x ¼ 12, y ¼ 6, z ¼ 10, puncorr < .001, Z ¼ 3.23). By
contrast, there was no activation in the amygdala associated
with magnitude estimation during the presentation phase,
even when using a lenient threshold of puncorr< .01. Likewise,
the activation in amygdala did not change with magnitude of
gains or losses separately. Previous studies have indicated an
important role of mOFC/vmPFC in valuation (e.g., Tom et al.,
2007), and by lowering the threshold to puncorr< .01 we could
confirmbilateral trends in themOFC reflecting increasing gain
magnitude (mOFC: x ¼ 8, y ¼ 54, z ¼ 12, puncorr < .01,
Z ¼ 3.25).
4. Discussion
The present study sheds new light on the role of the amygdala
in loss averse decision-making. We found that the amygdala
assessed the gain-loss ratio of a full bet during a gambling task
that required subjects to balance the gain and loss of each bet
in relation to subject-specific decision boundaries. In contrast,
single gain or loss amounts did not modulate amygdala ac-
tivity. This implies that the amygdala evaluates a mixed
gamble as a whole rather than assessing single magnitudes of
individual gains or losses.
We found that amygdala activity during the decision phase
was tuned to the individual decision boundary l. More pre-
cisely, amygdala activity increased the more the gain-loss
ratio of a given gamble deviated from the individual decision
boundary l. The amygdala response to increasingly aversive
and increasingly appetitive gambles is in good agreementwith
previous studies in human and non-human primates that
have implicated the amygdala in processing of both appetitive
and aversive stimuli during decision-making (Baxter &
Murray, 2002; Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal,
2001; Paton et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006). For instance,
single neurons in the amygdala displayed positive and nega-
tive linear increases in spiking activity with the values
assigned to individual food items, when patients with epi-
lepsy made simple purchase decisions between food items
(Jenison et al., 2011). Together, these results indicate that the
amygdala plays an important part in integrating subjective
appetitiveness and aversiveness of gain-loss ratios at the time
of choice.
The individual level of loss aversion (as reflected by the
decision boundary l) had an impact on the amygdala
response during decision-making. More loss aversive in-
dividuals (with a high l) put a stronger weight on asym-
metric gain-loss ratios that are distant to the individual
decision boundary than less loss averse individuals (with a
low l). The relationship between amygdala signaling and the
individual expression of loss aversion raises the possibility
that the amygdala reinforces a pre-existing bias towards loss
aversion. Indeed the amygdala has been implicated in
decision biases and guidance of loss averse decisions
(Canessa et al., 2013; De Martino et al., 2010; De Martino
et al., 2006).
Previous studies show that the amygdala support decisions
made under a high degree of uncertainty (Adams, Gordon,
Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003; Herry et al., 2007; Hsu, Bhatt,
Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005) and in assessing task
relevance (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Ousdal et al., 2012; Sander
et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2013). In this study, the nature of
the gambling task favored an engagement of the amygdala in
decision-making: The equal gain-loss probabilities and the
absence of feedback introduced maximal uncertainty with
respect to gamble outcomes. Although the level of uncertainty
was equally high for all bets, amygdala activity was stronger
for ratios at both extremes of the valence spectrum. The
increasing asymmetry of gain-loss ratios signaled high stakes
(i.e., potentially large losses or large gains) and entailed higher
potential financial impact. The present results are therefore in
agreement with the notion that the amygdala evaluates the
impact or relevance of a given choice.
This study is the first indicating a role of the amygdala in
balancing the entire gamble, as opposed to only reflecting
losses (Canessa et al., 2013), or even playing no role in loss
aversion (Tom et al., 2007). In the present study, a framing
setup was used to make subjects believe they were risking
some of their participation fee, while, in fact, all of the sub-
jects were predestined to keep their fee and even gain extra
money by the end of the experiment. However, participants
did not know this and they were thus very motivated to keep
the monetary participation fee that they had already counted
on, something that we believe resulted in a strong “endow-
ment effect” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980). In
contrast, other loss aversion studies typically endowed par-
ticipants with money to gamble for (Canessa et al., 2013;
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007). We believe that
our endowment method reflected a more naturalistic setup,
resembling real-life financial decisions more closely. This
resulted in a consistently high behavioral loss aversion and in
increased amygdala engagement when deciding to accept or
reject gambles.
Decisions required more effort the closer the gain-loss
ratio was to the individual decision boundary l, as evidenced
by longer deliberation times. This is likely to reflect the higher
similarity of subjective utilities for gains and losses, resulting
in more difficult decisions around the decision boundary. The
activity profile expressed by the amygdala is incompatible
with the claim that this region is tracking increasing choice
ambiguity. The results rather show the opposite, namely an
engagement of the amygdala in intuitively clear decisions,
facilitating fast decisions towards appetitive situations and
away from aversive ones. Difficulty of decision-making in
stead engaged areas, which are believed to monitor conflict
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such as the anterior insula and ACC (FitzGerald, Seymour, &
Dolan, 2009).
Although we have mainly focused on the amygdala, it
should be noted that decisionswere also influenced by a larger
network of regions including somatosensory components
(rolandic operculum, posterior insula and paracentral lobule)
and limbic components (hippocampus, amygdala and puta-
men). A similar functional networkwas recently hypothesized
to mediate an aversive signal that could bias decision-making
towards avoiding losses duringmixed gambles (Canessa et al.,
2013).
Here, we found that additional regions (i.e., inferior parietal
lobule, superior temporal gyrus and angular gyrus) also
influenced decisions. These latter regions have been linked to
reading and numerical computations (e.g., Carreiras et al.,
2009; Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999;
Hickok & Poeppel, 2007) and could have the important func-
tion of deciphering amounts (e.g., “$8” vs “þ$16”) and
calculating approximate gamble ratios based on these
amounts.
Ourmixed-gamble task included amagnitude presentation
phase and a decision-making phase. This allowed us to
investigate whether the amygdala separately or jointly pro-
cesses the gain and loss amounts of mixed gambles. The
amygdala did not respond to changes in stimulus value in the
passive presentation phase, neither when investigating the
whole spectrum from worst to best amount, nor for changes
in either gain or loss-magnitudes separately. However,
regional trends in the ventral striatumand themOFC reflected
increasing value and gain magnitude, respectively. Activity in
these specific regions indicate that neural computations in
this phase likely reflect valuation (e.g., Tom et al., 2007).
In the active decision-making phase, amygdala activity
did not code the gain or loss magnitude that determined the
absolute gain-loss ratio of the gamble. The amygdala also
did not reflect the absolute gain-loss ratio irrespective of
subject-specific l values. Instead, we found the amygdala to
be specifically involved in balancing gain-loss ratios relative
to the subjective decision boundary. As distance increased
between gain-loss ratio and the individual decision bound-
ary, amygdala activity became stronger. Under those con-
ditions, the involvement of the amygdala correlated nicely
with the degree of individual loss-aversion biases, extending
previous studies that have implicated the amygdala in loss
processing and behavioral loss aversion (Canessa et al., 2013;
De Martino et al., 2010; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Yacubian
et al., 2006). Since amygdala activation was absent during
the magnitude presentation phase, it is unlikely
that amygdala activity in the decision phase was
confounded by “spill-over” amygdala activity from the
prospect phase.
Together with the amygdala, the ventral striatum was
tuned to the gradual increase in subjectively aversive and
appetitive gambles in more loss averse subjects. We speculate
that loss averse subjects may have an enhanced reliance on
choice-related emotions (so-called “gut-feelings”) which
wouldhelp themavoid unfavorable situations (i.e., losing large
amounts of money) and approach favorable situations (i.e.,
gaining large amounts) (Coricelli et al., 2005; Rogan et al., 2005;
Sangha et al., 2013; Seymour et al., 2005). In the absence of
actual feedback, this could assist individuals to navigate in
their personalized ’decision-space’ of gain-loss ratios. How-
ever, further research is needed to explain the origin of this
stronger reliance on the amygdala in more biased subjects.
In conclusion, our results significantly expand previous
work by showing a consistent role of the amygdala in delin-
eating the subjective decision-space. Importantly, the present
results point to a primary engagement of the amygdala in
actual decision-making, since it was active only after subjects
obtained complete information about the gain-loss ratio.
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